Uniform Commercial Code - Farmers as Merchants in North Carolina by Massey, Beverly Wheeler
Campbell Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 1 1979 Article 6
1979
Uniform Commercial Code - Farmers as
Merchants in North Carolina
Beverly Wheeler Massey
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Beverly Wheeler Massey, Uniform Commercial Code - Farmers as Merchants in North Carolina, 1 Campbell L. Rev. 141 (1979).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-FARMERS AS MER-
CHANTS IN NORTH CAROLINA-Currituck Grain, Inc. v.
Powell, 38 N.C. App. 7, 246 S.E.2d 853 (1978).
N.C. Court Breaks New Ground
INTRODUCTION
One of the "underlying purposes [of the Uniform Commercial
Code' is] . . . to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions."' As a general rule courts of the forty-nine states which have
adopted the Code3 have achieved uniformity in their interpretation
and application of Code provisions.' Courts of the various jurisdic-
tions, however, have reached inconsistent results in the determina-
tion of whether a farmer is a merchant within the meaning of the
Code.5 As indicated by Currituck Grain, Inc. v. Powell,' the North
Carolina Court of Appeals is in accord with five other state courts
and three federal courts' in holding that a farmer may be a mer-
chant for purposes of the statute of frauds provision of the Code.,
Section 2-201 bars a merchant-seller from raising the statute of
frauds as a defense in an action based on an oral sales contract if
he has received a written confirmation of the contract from the
merchant-buyer within a reasonable time and has failed to object
in writing to the confirmation within ten days. This note briefly
examines approaches of other courts to the issue of the farmer as a
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 25 (1965). (The North Carolina cite corresponds to the
1962 Official Text except that the chapter number "25" precedes each section).
2. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
3. Louisiana has adopted Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5 only; see R. BRAUCHER & R.
RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS xxxvii (1977).
4. [1966] 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SER. § 1.01 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
BENDER).
5. See, e.g., Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) (farmer
held to be a merchant); Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa
1977) (farmer held not to be a merchant). See generally 3 BENDER, supra note 4, at
note 17.
6. 38 N.C. App. 7, 246 S.E.2d 853 (1978).
7. See Continental Grain Co. v. Martin, 536 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1976); Conti-
nental Grain Co. v. Brown, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1978); Continental
Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Il1.
2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975); Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill. App. 3d 702, 313 N.E.2d
628 (1974); Barron v. Edwards, 45 Mich. App. 210, 206 N.W.2d 508 (1973); Rush
Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Mo. Farmers Ass'n., 555 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1977); Ohio
Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973); Nelson v.
Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (1965) (Formal Requirements; statute of
frauds).
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merchant and the impact and potential scope of the Currituck
Grain decision.
THE CASE
Plaintiff brought an action in Currituck County District Court
for breach of an oral contract entered into in 1974,1 in which plaintiff
agreed to purchase and defendant agreed to sell corn and soybeans
at a later date for a specified price. The alleged breach consisted of
defendant's failure to deliver the corn and soybeans.
Although the defendant had been a farmer for approximately
two and one-half years'0 he had never sold corn or soybeans prior to
the date of the alleged contract." In addition to denying the exist-
ence of the alleged contract, defendant pleaded G.S. § 25-2-201(1),
the statute of frauds provision of the Code," as an affirmative de-
fense.
In response to defendant's motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff claimed that both plaintiff and defendant were merchants
within the meaning of G.S. § 25-2-104(1). " Plaintiff further claimed
that because it had mailed a written confirmation of the contract
to defendant to which defendant had failed to object within ten
days, defendant was barred from asserting the statute of frauds
provision by G.S. § 25-2-201(2)."
9. 28 N.C. App. 563, 564, 222 S.E.2d 1, 1 (1976).
10. Id. at 566, 222 S.E.2d at 3.
11. 38 N.C. App. at 8, 246 S.E.2d at 854.
12. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 25-2-201(1) (1965) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods
for the price of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his author-
ized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but-the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104(1) (1965) provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (1965) provides:
Between merchants if in a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements
of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to
its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
[Vol. 1:141
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/6
FARMER As MERCHANT
The district court entered summary judgment for defendant
based on defendant's affidavit which, according to the district
court, established that the defendant was not a merchant.
On appeal the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a well-
reasoned opinion by Judge Arnold, reversed the district court's
order for summary judgment and remanded the case for trial be-
cause the defendant's affidavit failed to establish that defendant
was not a merchant under G.S. § 25-2-201(2). Judge Arnold pointed
out that defendant had failed "to show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact" required by Rule 56(c)15 because the affidavit
did "not establish whether the defendant had ever negotiated with
grain dealers prior to 1974, whether he had ever sold corn and soy-
beans previously, or whether he had knowledge of the customs and
practices peculiar to the marketing of these grains."'"
On remand defendant testified that he had never sold corn or
soybeans prior to the transaction in question.'7 The case again went
before the court of appeals when defendant appealed a verdict for
plaintiff. Defendant claimed, inter alia, that the district court erred
in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict and for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict since, according to defendant, he
was not a merchant as a matter of law under the criteria established
by Judge Arnold." Defendant claimed he therefore was entitled to
the statute of frauds defense. Judge Webb, speaking for the court,
disagreed stating that "the [prior] opinion does'not hold as to
what constitutes a merchant within the meaning of the statute.'"9
He then held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's
finding0 that the defendant-farmer, by his occupation, held himself
15. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56.
16. 28 N.C. App. at 568, 222 S.E.2d at 4.
17. The opinion does not indicate whether the defendant testified as to Judge
Arnold's other two criteria. However, the record on appeal contained testimony by
the defendant that he had never sold any corn, soybeans or other grain prior to 1974
and that he had no knowledge of the customs and practices with respect to the
marketing and selling of the grain he produced.
18. 28 N.C. App. at 568, 222 S.E.2d at 4.
19. 38 N.C. App. at 8, 246 S.E.2d at 854.
20. Although the court did not address whether the jury should have decided
the merchant issue, other courts have commented on this question. See Continen-
tal Grain Co. v. Martin, 536 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1976); Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v.
Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977); Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977); Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976). The unani-
mous opinion of those courts is that whether a farmer is a merchant is ordinarily a
question for the fact-finder's determination. However, if all of the facts relevant to
the merchant issue are undisputed and if reasonable minds would draw no different
inferences from the facts, then the question is one of law for the courts to determine.
19791
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out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction and was therefore a merchant for pur-
poses of G.S. § 25-2-201(2). The court, however, granted defendant
a new trial on other grounds."'
BACKGROUND
A. A FARMER Is NOT A MERCHANT
To date, six of the twelve states which have considered the
question have refused to apply the status of merchant to farmers.2 2
Each case involved the applicability of the "merchant's exception"
to the statute of frauds.n Although section 2-104(1) of the Code
defines the term "merchant," two courts did not rely on that defini-
tion in reaching their decisions.2 ' Rather, they relied upon the plain
meaning of the term "merchant. 2 5 Two other courts established
factors which they used in determining if a person is a merchant
under 2-201(2). The Kansas Supreme Court stressed professional-
ism as a factor along with special knowledge and commercial experi-
ence.26 The South Dakota Supreme Court stressed not only particu-
lar knowledge or experience in selling, buying or dealing in future
commodity transactions, but also the parties' relative knowledge of
the marketplace." The Iowa Supreme Court applied the same test
21. 38 N.C. App. at 12, 246 S.E.2d at 856. On the second remand, defendant
was found liable for the full amount of the contract.
22. Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota and Utah. See Loeb &
Co. v. Shreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975); Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis,
239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965); Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d
663 (Iowa 1977); Decatur Coop. Ass'n. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976);
Terminal Grain Corp. v. Freeman, - S.D. -, 270 N.W.2d 806 (1978); Lish v.
Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976).
23. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
24. Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965); Lish v.
Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976).
25. "Professional trader" was the definition used in Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis,
239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965). "One whose occupation is that of buying and
selling" was the definition used in Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976). The
Lish court held that a man who had been a hay and grain farmer for 25 years and
who negotiated and contracted the sale of his crops each year was not a merchant
with regard to an oral contract to sell his 1973 wheat crop.
26. In Decatur Coop. Ass'n. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, -, 547 P.2d 323, 328
(1976) the court held that defendant, a member of plaintiff-cooperative, a wheat
farmer 20 years, a custom harvester of wheat and other grains for other farmers and
a grower of 500 acres of wheat in the year of the contract, was not a merchant.
Although the court acknowledged the presence of special skill or knowledge, it
stressed the absence of professionalism. See also 3 BENDER, supra note 4, at § 1.02.
27. Although the defendant-farmer had sold grain prior to the transaction in
[Vol. 1:141
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that the North Carolina Court of Appeals used in the Currituck
Grain case 8 but reached a different result. The Iowa court hdld that
a farmer who sold only the crops he grew and who sold those crops
only three times prior to the creation of the oral contract in question
was not a merchant with regard to the transaction since he was an
expert in growing crops, not in selling them. 9
B. A FARMER IS A MERCHANT
The five other state courts and three federal courts which held
that a particular farmer may be a merchant under section 2-201(2)"0
relied on one or more of five factors. The most common factor con-
sidered was the farmer's prior experience in selling his crop includ-
ing frequency and duration of sales of the particular crop.3' Other
factors considered include the farmer's familiarity with the mar-
ket, 3 the number of years he had been a farmer,3 3 the contractual
question, the court held that he was not a merchant with regard to a contract for
the future sale of his grain since he had sold his grain only to local elevators for
cash or had stored it under a federal loan program. The opinion failed to state how
many years the defendant had been a farmer. The court also stressed the parties'
unequal knowledge of market fluctuations and of many factors affecting the mar-
ket. Terminal Grain Corp. v. Freeman, - S.D. -, 270 N.W.2d 806 (1978).
28. Based on the criteria set out in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (Definitions:
"Merchant").
29. Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 1977).
30. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
31. Continental Grain v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(defendant-farmer had sold soybeans for only a few months but had sold corn for
five to six years previously; the court held that defendant failed to prove that corn
and soybeans are not the same kind of goods); Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585,
328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) (for at least five years previous, defendant sold his crops to
grain elevators in cash sales and in future contracts); Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill.
App. 3d 702, -, 313 N.E.2d 628, 630 (1974) (defendants had sold soybeans and
other grains for several years; the court held that "a farmer who regularly sells his
crops is a person 'who deals in goods of that kind' " and is therefore a merchant);
Barron v. Edwards, 45 Mich. App. 210, ., 206 N.W.2d 508, 511 (1973) (the court
found that "plaintiff had sold sod on numerous occasions"; the court made no in-
depth discussion of the merchant issue); Rush Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Mo.
Farmers Ass'n., 555 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1977) (defendant "had sold soybeans to eleva-
tors for many, many years"); Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203,
318 N.E.2d 428 (1973) (defendant sold beans "for a number of years"); Nelson v.
Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977) (defendant had sold one
wheat crop annually for seven years prior to the transaction in question).
32. Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (de-
fendant was the president of a farming corporation and was familiar with the
Chicago Board of Trade); Rush Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Mo. Farmers Ass'n., 555
S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1977) (defendant checked with many grain elevators to deter-
mine the current market price, was familiar with the operation of grain elevators
1979]
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amount in question 34 and whether the crop sold was the farmer's
principal crop. 5
C. THE EFFECT OF BEING A MERCHANT UNDER 2-201
Although thirteen different Code provisions3 apply to mer-
chants, it should be emphasized that the cases mentioned above
and the Currituck Grain case were concerned with whether a farmer
was a merchant under the statute of frauds provision of the Code.37
Under 2-201(2), if the oral contract arises "between merchants ' 38
and the buyer sends the seller a written confirmation of the contract
within a reasonable time, the statute of frauds provision is unavaila-
ble as a defense for the merchant-seller unless he objects in-writing
to the contents of the written confirmation within ten days of its
receipt.39 By holding him a merchant under 2-201(2), the courts
place a minimum burden on a farmer. That section requires him as
a merchant merely to open his mail, read the sale confirmation and
promptly notify the buyer of any objections.0
If the farmer-seller is not a merchant under 2-201(2), then the
merchant-buyer bears a disproportionate risk with regard to future
and was capable of determining the current market price); Ohio Grain Co. v.
Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973) (defendant was "clearly
familiar with farm markets and their operation" and followed the markets with
care); Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977) (defendant
kept abreast of current market prices through the use of the radio and the tele-
phone).
33. Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (20
years); Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) (34 years); Ohio
Grain-Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App,. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973) (many years).
34. The court held in Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 23 U.C.C. Rep, 872
(W.D. Wis. 1978) that the transaction was not a "casual sale," and therefore
defendant was a merchant because of the contract price and the amount of grain
involved.
35. In Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
defendant grew and sold soybeans and potatoes. The transaction in question in-
volved soybeans. The; court held that defendant had failed to prove that corn and
soybeans are not the same kind of crop. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1978). See also 3 BENDER, supra note 4, at § 1.02.
36. 3 BENDER, supra note 4, at § 1.02.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (1965).
38. U.C.C. § 2-104(3) provides: "'Between merchants' means in any trans-
action with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or
skill of merchants."
39. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 3. The plaintiff-buyer still must prove the exist-
ence of the oral contract.
40. 3 BENDER, supra note 4, at § 2.04(2).
[Vol. 1:141
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commodity contracts." For example, assume the following facts: An
oral contract was made on July 1 for the sale of one hundred bushels
of soybeans for delivery in the fall at a price of $6 per bushel, the
July market price. The farmer-seller received within a reasonable
time a written confirmation of the oral contract, signed by the
merchant-buyer. The farmer did not object to the confirmation. On
September 1, the market price for soybeans dropped to $5 per
bushel. Under these facts, the merchant-buyer would be bound to
the contract by his written confirmation since it would constitute a
"writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought."'" If, however, the market price had risen in-
stead of dropped, the seller-farmer who was not a merchant legally
would be free to take advantage of the subsequent rise in price by
denying the existence of the oral contract. As a non-merchant he
would be entitled to assert G.S. § 25-2-201(1) as a defense in an
action by the original buyer-merchant to enforce the contract since
no "writing . . .signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought" exists.' 3
ANALYSIS
Recognizing the disjunctive language of the statutory definition
of "merchant," the court in Currituck Grain, Inc. v. Powell4 estab-
lished a three-pronged test based on the "plain words of the stat-
ute":45
As applied to this case a merchant is
(1) one who deals in corn or soybeans, or
(2) one who by his occupation holds himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the practice of dealing in corn or soybeans,
or
(3) one who by his occupation holds himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the goods involved in the transaction which
are corn and soybeans."
The court held that evidence that defendant was a farmer raising
corn and soybeans sufficiently supported the jury's finding that
41. Id.
42. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds).
43. Id.
44. 38 N.C. App. 7, 246 S.E.2d 853.
45. Id. at 10, 246 S.E.2d at 855.
46. Id. at 9, 246 S.E.2d at 855. A fourth prong, based on employment of an
agent or broker, is present in the statute but was not discussed by the court since
no facts indicated any such agency relationship.
19791
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defendant was a merchant under the second and third prongs of the
test. 7
Note that the court in Currituck Grain did not find that the
defendant had actual knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods or
practices, but rather found that by his occupation of farming, defen-
dant held himself out as having that knowledge. The court did not
consider any of the factors other courts have considered, such as the
farmer's prior experience in selling his crop, the number of years he
had been a farmer, the size of the transaction in question and the
question of whether the commodity involved was the farmer's prin-
cipal crop." Such factors would relate to the question of whether a
farmer was a merchant only if the courts based their decisions on
the extent of the farmer's actual knowledge of the goods or the
practices involved in the transaction. The court also failed to con-
sider the criteria suggested on the initial appeal: (1) defendant's
experience in negotiating with grain dealers, (2) defendant's experi-
ence in selling corn and soybeans and (3) defendant's knowledge of
the customs and practices peculiar to the marketing of corn and
soybeans. 9 Those criteria are closely in line with the actual knowl-
edge test. Thus, while other courts which held a farmer to be a
merchant based their decisions on an "actual knowledge" test, as
did Judge Arnold, the court in Currituck Grain indicated that it will
follow an "occupation" test in deciding who is a merchant for pur-
poses of the statute of frauds provision of the Code. The court also
noted that "none of the cases construe the statute as we do, but we
believe the plain words of the statute govern. ' '
In reaching its decision, the court may have disregarded the
most obvious ground for holding that the defendant-farmer in this
case was a merchant, the first prong of the test, dealing in corn or
soybeans. Since the Code does not define the term "deals," the
court could have used the plain meaning of that term, "to buy or
sell," to hold that the defendant-farmer was a merchant because he
"dealt" in corn and soybeans."' Seemingly, however, the court in-
tentionally declined to utilize the first prong of the test in this fact
situation. Virtually any person whose occupation is farming would
47. Id. at 10, 246 S.E.2d at 855.
48. See supra notes 31 through 33.
49. If the court on the second appeal had relied on the factors suggested by
Judge Arnold, it would seem, in light of the defendant's testimony that he had
never sold corn or soybeans before, that defendant would not have been deemed a
merchant. 28 N.C. App. at 568, 222 S.E.2d at 4.
50. 38 N.C. App. at 10, 246 S.E.2d at 855.
51. Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977).
[Vol. 1:141
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be a merchant for purposes of the statute of frauds provision under
the occupation test, the second and third prongs. The court there-
fore can apply the first prong, the dealing test, to persons who farm
but whose occupation might not be farming. For example, a carpen-
ter who also raises and sells a soybean crop each year probably
does not hold himself out by his occupation of carpentry as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to soybeans or peculiar to the practice
of dealing in soybeans. But if he has "dealt" previously in soybeans,
that is, if he previously has bought or sold soybeans, then he would
be a merchant under the first prong of the test. The question of
how many times he must have bought or sold soybeans before he
"dealt" in soybeans is unanswered in North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
In Currituck Grain, Inc. v. Powell5 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals indicates that every farmer is a merchant for purposes
of G.S. § 25-2-201(2) with regard to the type of crops he grows-and
sells. The defendant-farmer had farmed only about two and one-
half years prior to the alleged contract and had never sold corn or
soybeans prior to the transaction in question." Thus the court in
Currituck Grain seemed to define even the casual or inexperienced
farmer as a merchant.54 In addition, a farmer who is very experi-
52. 38 N.C. App. 7, 246 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
53. Id. at 8, 246 S.E.2d at 854. Cf. Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (defendant who had sold corn for five to six years prior
to the transaction in question and who had been a farmer for 20 years was held to
be a merchant); Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) (defen-
dant, a farmer for 34 years, had sold his crop for at least five years prior to the
transaction in question and was held to be a merchant); Nelson v. Union Equity
Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977) (defendant who had sold his wheat crop
for seven years prior to the transaction in question was held to be a merchant). But
cf. Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977) (defendant sold
his crops three times prior to the transaction in question and was held not to be a
merchant); Decatur Coop. Ass'n. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976)
(defendant, a farmer for 20 years, was held not to be a merchant); Lish v. Compton,
547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976) (defendant, a farmer for 25 years who negotiated and
contracted the sale of his crops each year was held not to be a merchant).
54. Official Comment 1 to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104 (1965) may seem
contrary to Currituck Grain. It contrasts the "casual or inexperienced seller" to
the merchant as follows:
This Article assumes that transactions between professionals in a given
field require special and clear rules which may not apply to a casual or
inexperienced seller or buyer . . . . This section lays the foundation of
this policy by defining those who are to be regarded as professionals or
"merchants" and by stating when a transaction is deemed to be "between
merchants".
19791
9
Massey: Uniform Commercial Code - Farmers as Merchants in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
enced in selling his crops may operate under the mistaken belief
that if he did not sign anything no binding agreement exists. Under
the Currituck Grain decision both farmers, because of their occu-
pations, will be considered merchants despite their inexperience
or ignorance of the law. Neither will be entitled to the statute of
frauds defense in an action brought by the buyer to enforce the oral
contract.
Even though Currituck Grain appears out of line with other
cases holding a farmer to be a merchant and with the implied cri-
teria set forth in the appellate court's previous opinion, the decision
is justified by the Code. In reaching its decision, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals followed the literal meaning of section 2-104. Upon
close examination of the Code's definition of merchant, the occupa-
tion test is technically more correct than the actual knowledge test.
Section 2-104 never refers to actual knowledge as a basis for apply-
ing the merchant status to a person. 5
The decision also complies with the spirit of the Code. The
Official Comment" to section 2-104 recognizes that a person may be
a merchant for purposes of one Code provision and not for purposes
of another. 57 The Comment indicates the existence of a broad defini-
tion of "merchant" and of a narrow definition as well. Section 2-
201(2), the merchant's exception to the statute of frauds, falls
within the broad definition of "merchant.15 According to Comment
Two, section 2-201(2) is one of the sections which
rest on normal business practices which are or ought to be typical
of and familiar to any person in business. For purposes of these
sections almost every person in business, would, therefore, be
deemed to be a "merchant" under the language "who. . .by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices ...involved in the transaction . . ." since the
practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized business
practices such as answering mail.
However, Official Comment 2 to the same section seems to conflict with Official
Comment 1.
55. The actual knowledge test, however, does seem to be fairer and has been
used more than the occupation test. It does seem unfair to require a "mere tiller of
the soil" to be familiar with the Uniform Commercial Code. Perhaps the legislature
should redefine the Code definition of "merchant" as to farmers.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104 (1965) (Official Comment 2).
57. 3 BENDER, supra note 4, at § 3.03(1)(b). See also Clifford, Article Two:
Sales, 44 N.C. LAw REv. 539 (1966).
58. The other Code sections falling within the broad definition of "merchant"
are § 2-205 (firm offers), § 2-207 (Confirmatory Memoranda) and § 2-209 (Modi-
fication).
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FARMER As MERCHANT
In light of the Official Comment's assertion that facts which
"may be sufficient to establish the merchant status [are] indicated
by the nature of the [various] provisions,"59 little danger exists that
North Carolina courts will hold an inexperienced farmer to the stan-
dards of a merchant with regard to any Code provisions which are
interpreted under the narrow definition of merchant, 0 such as sec-
tion 2-314,11 the implied warranty of merchantability. Assume, for
example, that the farmer-seller in Currituck Grain had fulfilled the
contract and had delivered the corn and soybeans to the buyer as
required by the contract; but upon inspection the buyer discovered
that for some reason the corn and soybeans were not of merchanta-
ble quality. Under section 2-314, the warranty of merchantability is
implied only "if a seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind." Comment Three to section 2-314 states that "a person mak-
ing an isolated sale of goods is not a 'merchant' within the meaning
of the full scope of this section . "..  Therefore, the farmer-seller
in Currituck Grain seemingly would not be a merchant for purposes
of section 2-314; and as a result, the implied warranty of merchant-
ability would not exist. That same inexperienced farmer was a
merchant in Currituck Grain under the broad definition for pur-
poses of section 2-201(2).
Beverly Wheeler Massey
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104 (1965) (Official Comment 2).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 25-2-314(1) provides: "Unless excluded or modified (§ 25-2-316), a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."
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